Internet of Things (IoT) deployments are becoming increasingly automated and vastly more complex. Facilitated by programming abstractions such as trigger-action rules, end-users can now easily create new functionalities by interconnecting their devices and other online services. However, when multiple rules are simultaneously enabled, complex system behaviors arise that are diicult to understand or diagnose. While history tells us that such conditions are ripe for exploitation, at present the security states of trigger-action IoT deployments are largely unknown.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is growing rapidly. With predictions of 20 billion deployed IoT devices by 2020 [1] , the IoT has evolved from isolated single devices to integrated platforms that facilitate interoperability between diferent devices and online services (e.g., Gmail). Samsung's SmartThings [11] , Apple's HomeKit [4] , IFTTT [5] and Zapier [17] are just a few examples. IoT platforms support end-user customizations, with many going so far as to provide programming frameworks for the design of simple automation logic that enable customized functionality. Currently, trigger-action programming (TAP) is the most commonly-used model to create automations in IoT. Studies have shown that about 80% of the automation requirements of typical users can be represented by TAP and that even non-programmers can easily learn this paradigm [85] .
Unfortunately, as IoT deployments grow in complexity, so do their attack surface ś as users further automate their homes, unexpected interactions between the automation rules may give rise to alarming new classes of security issues [81] . Consider the possibility that a user has installed the rule If temperature exceeds 30 • C, then open my windows; while this may be innocuous in isolation, it could be leveraged by an attacker to gain physical entry to the house if the user has also installed the rule (If you say) łAlexa, trigger heaterž, then turn the heater on. While IoT presents a variety of novel security challenges, the threats created by the ease of trigger-action automation are worthy of careful consideration.
Reasoning about the security of trigger-action IoT platforms requires a precise understanding of the interplay between triggeraction rules. The circumstances under which the interactions between two rules should be designated as a bug or vulnerability, as opposed to a feature, are not presently clear. Even among small rulesets, such as the real-world example shown in Figure 1 , it is not immediately obvious whether this composition of 5 rules could lead to a breach in the user's home security system; in fact, because the three rules (r 2, r 4, r 5) all modify the security mode of the user's Somfy Home Security System, there is a legitimate risk that the system could reach an unsafe state. What further frustrates analysis is the fact that trigger-action IoT ecosystems are closed-sourced and developed by a variety of third parties, rendering existing program analysis techniques unusable.
In this work, we describe three distinct and inter-related efforts to enable precise reasoning about IoT security postures. To [6] . Rules are represented as hexagon vertices, triggers using oval vertices, actions using rectangle vertices, and services using cloud vertices.
better understand trigger-action rule bugs, we irst exhaustively explore the space of inter-rule vulnerabilities within trigger-action IoT platforms. This taxonomy of inter-rule vulnerabilities attempts to systematize problems identiied by other recent work in this space [30, 32, 52, 70] and uncovers new subclasses of this vulnerability. Second, we leverage formal methods to enable the detection of these bugs; we present the design and implementation of iRuler, an IoT analysis framework that leverages Satisiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solving and model checking to discover inter-rule vulnerabilities. However, iRuler requires an information low graph of the IoT deployment to operate, which at present is unavailable due to the opacity of commodity IoT platforms. To overcome this obstacle in the absence of viable program analysis techniques, the third and inal element of our design is an approach to infer inter-rule information lows by using Natural Language Processing (NLP) to inspect the text descriptions of triggers and actions on the IoT platform website.
We evaluate iRuler against a real-world dataset of 315,393 applets found on the IFTTT website. Testing against a manually-coded ground truth of inter-rule lows, we ind that our NLP tool is able to eliminate 72% of false dependencies in the IFTTT ecosystem with minimal Type I error, the sources of which we characterize in discussion. iRuler detects vulnerabilities in speciic conigurations of IoT deployments, but at present robust data on realistic conigurations is not publicly available. To address this, we develop a method for synthesizing plausible rulesets based on publiclyvisible install counts of IFTTT applets. By testing iRuler on these synthetic conigurations, we discover the widespread potential for inter-rule vulnerabilities in the IFTTT platform, with 66% of the rulesets being associated with at least one such vulnerability.
BACKGROUND 2.1 Trigger-action IoT Platforms
Home automation IoT platforms commonly use the trigger-action programming paradigm, which provides an intuitive abstraction for non-technical users wishing to automate their devices. Broadly, Table 1 : A comparison of several popular trigger-action platforms, which vary in their support for conditions, rules with multiple actions, parameter passing from triggers to actions, and a rule store. a trigger-action (TA) program speciies that when a certain trigger event occurs (e.g., motion is detected), one or more actions (e.g., turn on the light) should be subsequently executed. Emerging trigger-action models are also becoming more expressive through the introduction of advanced features. In Table 1 , we compare the trigger-action models in 5 popular smart home platforms and 3 popular task automation platforms. While we note the diferences between these platforms, our study considers a generalized triggeraction model in which each rule can have one trigger, one or more actions, and a condition associated with each action.
Trigger-action Rule Chaining. The power of the trigger-action programming paradigm is that rules can be chained together [81] ; the execution of an action can invoke another trigger event, causing another rule to execute. There are two ways rules can be chained, examples of which are given in Figure 2 in the form of trigger- The IFTTT Platform. If-this-then-that (IFTTT) [5] is a web-based task-automation platform which allows users to connect diferent services to create automations using the trigger-action paradigm. Services are typically published by third parties, facilitating interoperability with smart devices (e.g., Nest thermostat) or online services (e.g., Gmail and Facebook). Each supported service publishes a set of triggers and actions that are akin to a service API. A trigger is a source of events in a service. For example, a trigger in the Nest thermostat service is łTemperature drops belowž, which ires every time the temperature drops below a threshold. An action is a task that a service can perform, e.g., sending an email. An applet (i.e., a rule) is an automation program that consists of one trigger and one or more actions. code snippet. The ilter code has access to the data returned by the trigger and metadata like the current time. It can use the information to override action ield values or skip an action. An example ilter code snippet is provided in Appendix A.
Model Checking and Rewriting Logic
Model checking [48] is a technique that checks if a system meets a given speciication by systematically exploring the system's state.
In an ideal case, a model checker exhaustively examines all possible system states to verify if there is any violation of speciications.
Rewriting logic [61] , a logic of concurrent change that can naturally deal with state and with concurrent computations, ofers a clean-yet highly expressive-mathematical foundation to assign formal meaning to open system computation. In rewriting logic, concurrent computations are axiomatized by (possibly conditional) rewrite rules of the form l → r , meaning that any system state satisfying the pattern l will be transited to a system state satisfying the pattern r . For any given state, many rewrite rules can be active, thus allowing for non-determinism. Rewriting logic has been used to model and analyze diferent distributed systems [54ś57].
THREAT MODEL & ASSUMPTIONS
We consider an adversary that seeks to covertly compromise an IoT deployment via rule-level attacks that target the logic layer of an IoT platform. Rule-level attacks seek to subvert the intent of the end user by exploiting the interactions of the IoT automation rules. Such interactions may enable the attacker to execute privileged actions, cause denial of service on devices or access sensitive information belonging to the user. These attacks are enabled solely through the invocation of automation rules that were legitimately installed by the user. There are many scenarios through which an attacker could create or detect the opportunity for rule-level attacks.
• Exploitation: An adversary discovers an exploitable interaction between two or more benign apps or invokes a trigger event through manipulation of a 3rd party service [41] . • Targeted Rules: An adversary tricks a user into installing rules that enable an attack, e.g., through phishing or social engineering. • Malicious Apps: An adversary develops and distributes a malicious app that contains hidden functionality [23, 38, 49, 84] . Recent work has considered powerful adversaries that obtain root access to devices [3] or compromise communication protocols [2] , which are out of scope in this work. While important, these strong adversarial models run the risk of downplaying the potential dangers posed by everyday attackers without advanced technical knowledge. Prior work has demonstrated that IoT end users often make errors in writing trigger-action rules [46, 68, 86] . Since they are often unaware of the implications of rules interactions, it stands to reason that users' creation, deletion, or misconiguration of rules leads to security vulnerabilities in their homes. Our threat model also accounts for the safety risks of benign misconigurations, which pose a real-world threat. We thus argue that rule-level attacks are an important consideration for IoT security, and note also that similar threat models have appeared in related work [23, 30, 49, 70, 87] .
INTER-RULE VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we consider and deine the interference conditions for trigger-action rules, which we call inter-rule vulnerabilities. For generality, we deine each inter-rule vulnerability as a property of an abstracted information low graph for an IoT deployment; we concretize these deinitions in later sections once the state for various devices and automation rules are known.
Consider the graph G =< V , E > that encodes the active automation logic for an IoT deployment. Vertices V can be of type T , C, or A, respectively representing triggers, conditions, and actions. All edges carry state from one vertex to another, but this state is device and coniguration-speciic; for now, we only deine an abstract state for condition vertices as a boolean lag, i.e., STATE(c) ∈ {0, 1}. Edges that low into conditions may update this state, i.e., ON(c) or OFF(c). Null conditions can also exist in the graph where STATE(c) = 1 always. An individual rule R j is given by {t j , c j , a j }; rule vertices are otherwise elided. Using the above system, events in the IoT deployment can be represented as path traversals in graph G. An event trigger t being ired is represented by ACTIVATE(t ), which causes branching traversal of the outbound directed edges of vertex t. Traversal automatically proceeds from all trigger and action vertices, leading to additional ACTIVATE(t ) and ACTIVATE(a) events. Traversal only proceeds from condition vertices if STATE(c) = 1. Traversal concludes when all paths have reached either a childless action vertex or a condition vertex where STATE(c) = 0. A path p ∈ P describes the series of valid transitions that occurred in the graph traversal, with the set P deining all valid paths.
We now enumerate the space of inter-rule vulnerabilities in terms of properties of IoT information low graphs. We will do so with respect to a benign rule Figure 4 : Condition blocking scenarios. In 4a, removing a i will make c b unsatisiable. In 4b, a i 's activation makes c b unsatisiable. home). However, when a trigger is ired, all associated rules are activated; if there are multiple paths to the security-sensitive action, the burden is on the user to apply the condition for all active rules. The security guarantee of an action thus follows the weakest precondition, creating the potential for condition bypass:
Condition bypass is visualized in Figure 3 . As an example of the condition bypass threat, consider the rule łIf temperature is higher than 30 • C, when I am at home and time is between 8am to 6pm, then open the windowž. If another rule exists with a null condition, i.e., łIf temperature is higher than 30 • C, then open the windowž then the prior condition is trivially bypassed.
Condition
Block. An alternate vulnerability related to conditions is that a given condition is simply unsatisiable. Broadly, the deinition for condition blocking can be given as follows:
We identify two scenarios in which condition blocking is a potential issue, Not Enough Rules and Active Blocking, visualizations for which are shown in Figure 4 . For the former scenario, a condition may depend on other devices' states but there is no rule to manipulate the state in such a way to satisfy the condition. For example, if a user has a rule łIf motion is detected at the door when home is in armed state, then send me a notiicationž. If no action in the deployment sets the home's security system to the armed state, this condition cannot be satisied. Conversely, when Active Blocking occurs there is a buggy or malicious rule that actively disables the condition before the action can be activated. For example, another rule using the łIf motion is detected at the doorž trigger could specify an action that sets the home's security system to the disarmed state. In either case, the user's intended action is unreachable.
Action Revert. An alternate mechanism for preventing an action from having its intended efect is to immediately reverse it. For a given action a b , let there be an opposite action a ′ b that negates the a b 's efect. With this in mind, action reverting can be deined as:
) Action reverting is shown in Figure 5a . The reverting action pair shown here could be lock and unlock commands on a door. It is also possible that a b = a ′ b , e.g., an action that toggles a switch.
Action Conlict. In contrast to action reverting, which deterministically negates a b , action conlicts activate a b and a ′ b in a nondeterministic ordering, potentially putting the deployment in an unstable or unknown state. Action conlicts are deined as:
That is, there exist paths from t b to both a b and a ′ b , but the former path is not a subset of the latter path. In an action conlict, a door could be left in either a locked or unlocked state depending on non-deterministic state in the IoT platform. For ease of intuition, in the above deinition we consider an action conlict that arises based on the same trigger, but in fact an even more general deinition would accommodate diferent triggers. For example, the rules łWhen motion is detected, unlock the doorž and łEveryday at 11pm, lock the doorž will conlict if motion is detected at 11pm.
Action Loop. Intuitively, this vulnerability describes when an action's activation cyclically leads to its own re-activation. We can deine action looping as follows:
An example of action loop are the rules łIf the bedroom light is turned on, then turn of the living-room light" and łIf the living-room light is turned of when the home state is away, then turn on bedroom lightž. Further, attacks that exploit the action loop condition have previously been presented in the literature. For example, an attacker can use an action loop on a smart bulb to create strobe light that could potentially induce seizures [76] . An attacker can also use action looping as a side channel to leak information [49] .
Action Duplicate. Unexpected duplicate activation of an action can lead to user harm. For example, the duplication of an action to inject some medicine could cause health problem to a patient, or a duplicate transaction can cause inancial loss. Action looping is an instance of the action duplication vulnerability; a more general deinition is as follows:
In addition to action looping, this deinition accommodates the duplicate actions being invoked by the same or diferent triggers. Another circumstance in which action duplication arises is the event where one action in the deployment coniguration subsumes another action, which we do not deine here but account for when concretizing rules in the subsequent sections.
IRULER
In this section, we describe iRuler, our tool to detect inter-rule vulnerabilities in TA rulesets. The architecture and worklow of iRuler is shown in Figure 6 . Given a set of IoT apps from a TA platform, the Rule Parser extracts trigger-action rules from the apps and transforms the rules into Rule Representations (RR). The Model Builder takes the rule representations, device metadata and the user's deployment coniguration as input and generates an Intermediate Representation (IR) of the IoT deployment. The Checking Engine performs checking over the IR and outputs potential interrule vulnerabilities as introduced in Section 4. It is then up to the user to determine the severity of the warning and whether or not to correct the rules. In Figure 6 , the components in yellow are provided by the user, the components in green are platform-speciic and the components in blue are platform-agnostic. Our tool can be easily extended to another platform by implementing a rule parser and building device metadata for the platform. Below we discuss each component in more detail.
Rule Parser
An IoT app could contain multiple TA rules. The rule parser irst extracts all the rules in the app, then transforms the rules into uniform rule representations which are used by the model builder. Listing 1 shows the format of our rule representation. A rule is composed of a trigger and one or more actions. A trigger is deined as an event with a constraint and an event is deined in terms of subject (e.g., a certain device) and attribute. For example, the trigger łif temperature drops below 30ž is represented as temperature_sensor.temperature < 30. The event here is the value change in the measurement of the temperature sensor. An action comprises a condition, the subject, the command to execute and the arguments to the command. A condition or a constraint could be null (i.e., no condition) or a logical expression. The diference between them is that a constraint is a predicate over the event data while a condition could be a predicate over other subjects.
Formal Modeling with Model Builder
The model builder generates a model of the IoT deployment using rule representations, deployment coniguration describing the user's IoT deployment (e.g., the types of devices and where they are located), and device metadata. It then generates an intermediate representation for the checking engine. As an IoT deployment is essentially a distributed system interacting with a nondeterministic environment, we model the deployment as an event-based (e.g., device events and time events) transition system and we model the transitions with rewriting logic. Below we describe how we model diferent aspects of an IoT system.
Device/Service Modeling. Each device has a set of attributes, representing the states of the device, and supported commands (i.e., actuator capability). For example, a heater device may have a switch attribute and two commands turn_on and turn_off. A device command can change the values of one or more attributes, e.g., the turn_on command sets the value of the switch attribute to łonž. Further, the execution of a command can afect one or more environmental variables, e.g., the turn_on command can afect the temperature environmental variable. Devices can also observe multiple environmental variables (i.e., sensor capability). For example, a temperature sensor monitors the environment temperature. Each device instance is modeled as a device object, i.e., an instance of a particular device type. For example, a heater instance is modeled as < oid : Heater | switch : _ >, where oid is the id of the device.
Device State Transitions. To model the interaction of rules, it is important to model the state transitions of devices (or services) as the action of a rule could cause a state transition which invokes the trigger of another rule. For a device command that can change the device's attributes, we model the command execution as a transition from one device state to another. The value change of a device attribute is modeled as a device event. For example, the turn_off command of the heater is modeled as a transition from state < switch : on > to state < switch : of > with a switch change event Event(oid, switch : of) where oid is the id of the device.
Environment Modeling. Implicit chaining is achieved through environmental variables such as temperature. We model each environmental variable as an environment object, for example, < env.temperature | value : _ >. As a device usually only observes or afects environmental variables in the same place the device is deployed, we consider the same type of environmental variable in diferent zones (locations) as diferent variables. For example, the temperature of the bedroom and the temperature of the living room are treated as two diferent variables. Further, when the value of an environmental variable is updated, the corresponding attribute of a device that observe the variable will also be updated. For example, when the value of env.temperature_bedroom is changed, the temperature attribute of a temperature sensor in the bedroom will be updated to the same value. This is achieved with parallel state transitions which change both the environment object and the device object. If no location coniguration is provided for a device, we consider it as deployed in the common zone. Note that, our main purpose for environment modeling is to model the implicit chaining of a device's command to another device's event (e.g., temperature is higher than 30). Thus, we model each environmental variable with discrete values. A full modeling of environmental variables, such as dealing with real-time continuous environments with dynamic laws and time delays, and modeling correlations of environmental variables are out of our scope.
Time Modeling. We support temporal behavior modeling by modeling time as a monotonically increasing variable. Time advances when there is no other transition available. Time-based triggers (e.g., a timer at 8 am) are modeled as time events when the time variable advances to the speciic values. For device actuation that can afect environmental variables, we make state transitions of the environment objects to update their values as time advances. The updates are made based on the efects caused by the actuation. Currently, we support increase (i.e., increasing by a rate), decrease (i.e., decreasing by a rate) and change to efects (i.e., directly changing to a value). For example, if a heater increases the temperature with a rate r . For each time unit that the switch attribute of the heater is łonž, we make a state transition from < env.temperature | value : T > to < env.temperature | value : T + r >. If no rate r is provided, we use 1 as default. One optimization we use to reduce system states is to update the values of time and environmental variables only with the values used in the ruleset. For example, if there are two timers, one at 8 am and the other at 9 am , in the rules, we will advance time from 0 to 8 am then to 9 am instead of advancing the time by one time unit in the transitions.
Device/Service Metadata. The device metadata contains the necessary information for device modeling and environment modeling. For example, it deines the attributes and commands of a device type, the efects on environmental variables (e.g., increasing temperature) of a command, and state transitions of a device command (i.e., what events will be generated by the execution of a command). Device/Service metadata can be constructed by analyzing the documentation of an IoT platform or provided by the platform developers or experts [28, 51] . For the IFTTT platform, we construct the service metadata by crawling the web page of each service to get what triggers and actions the service supports. We describe how we extract state transitions of service actions using NLP techniques in Section 6. We show examples of a device metadata and a service metadata in Appendix C.1. The service metadata is generated with the help of the NLP techniques in Section 6.
Intermediate Representation. The model builder could generate intermediate representation for diferent model checkers. Due to its maturity and expressiveness, we use Maude [13] , which is a language and tool that supports the formal speciication and analysis of concurrent systems in rewriting logic [62] , as our checking engine. With rewriting logic, an IoT system, which is a concurrent system, can be naturally speciied as a rewrite theory R = (Σ, E, R) with (Σ, E) an equational theory describing system states, and R rewrite rules describing the system's concurrent transitions. Rewrite rules of the form crl Also note that we embed in the system state the constraints (e.g., ϕ ∧ T > S) along the way during the system transitions, which will be solved by the SMT solver in the symbolic reachability analysis.
Formal Analysis by Checking Engine
The checking engine takes the IR as input and uses rewriting modulo SMT [75] to discover inter-rule vulnerabilities. Rewriting modulo SMT is a symbolic technique combining the power of rewriting modulo theories, SMT solving, and model checking. For each combination of device states, we use it as an initial state to check the vulnerable properties as deined in Section 5.2. Since our goal is to ind existence of violations, we use the search command to search a reachable state that reveals the vulnerabilities. As an example, the following search command looks up to 1 solution and a search depth 15 for a reachable state in which the air conditioner is turned on, while the temperature sensed by the sensor from the house does not exceed the current setpoint: Note that the true on the left-hand side of the arrow indicates no initial constraints. Similar with [70] , we perform bounded model checking [25, 26] with the argument like ł [1, 15] ž to bound the search task to a certain depth to reduce the search space. The searchbased model checker returns either a vulnerable state reachable from the initial state or no solution, indicating no such vulnerability.
Besides the inter-rule vulnerabilities, our tool can also check other properties using the built-in LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) [ Figure 7 : Initial attempts at building trigger-action information low graphs sufered from state explosion and false dependencies.
model checker. For example, the air conditioner will be turned on if the in-house temperature exceeds the desired setpoint. The following command analyzes, from the initial state, if the air conditioner will be eventually turned on in all reachable states once the temperature is above the setpoint:
reduce modelCheck ( init , above ( C1 : Config ) -> [] < > on ( C2 : Config ) ) .
Note that above and on are two user-deined predicates on the system states. The temporal operator → represents the notion of łimplicationž, and □ ♢ the LTL notion of łalways eventuallyž.
IOT INFORMATION FLOW MODELING
As discussed in the prior section, iRuler requires an understanding of how triggers and actions interact to detect inter-rule vulnerabilities. In this section, we describe our approach to the automatic extraction of such lows from proprietary trigger-action platforms. At irst glance, identifying such lows seems trivial. However, in practice, identifying these links proves surprisingly diicult.
Preliminary Experiment: Following the methodology of [86] and [63] , we scraped the descriptions of 674 services and 315,393 applets from the IFTTT website. Recall that each trigger and action in an applet represent an API deined by a third-party service (channel). For example, the SmartThings service provides an action łLock a SmartThings devicež and a trigger łIf a SmartThings device is turned onž. The simplest way to model action-to-trigger lows within a service is to conservatively assume that all outbound triggers depend on all inbound actions. However, applying this naïve strategy generates 6637 intra-service lows, many of which are spurious and represent false dependencies. For example, in Figure 7 , the łLockž action of the SmartThings would not afect the łHumidity rises abovež trigger; these are two independent attributes that can be manipulated through this service. Thus, while information low within a rule (trigger-to-action) is deinitionally apparent, understanding inter-rule dependencies (action-to-trigger) requires decomposition of services into their underlying components so that true lows can be identiied.
NLP-based Information Flow Analysis
Given the proprietary nature of trigger-action IoT platforms, our options for analyzing the internal state of services are extremely limited. As observed in prior work [81, 84, 86] , analyzing text descriptions of IoT components that appear on the platform websites provides one means of overcoming this obstacle. We now present an approach that leverages Natural Language Processing (NLP) in the design of an information low analysis framework, an overview of which is given in Figure 8 . To eliminate the spurious lows and to detect the true information lows, we pose this problem as a supervised classiication problem. Our framework learns a function to map an Action (A) and Trigger (T ) pair from a Service (S) to a binary output specifying whether an information low exists from A to T . As a irst step toward our goal, we need to encode each ⟨A,T ⟩ pair as a set of numeric features.
Syntactic Element Extraction.
To simplify the analysis of unstructured text, we irst perform Part-of-Speech (POS) tagging and Dependency Parsing using the Stanford CoreNLP [12] library to produce a dependency tree for the description of each rule component. An example dependency tree for an action description is shown in Figure 9 . The parser performs Dependency Parsing to identify the root verb representing the main task of the rule component. All other syntactic units are either directly or indirectly connected to the root by dependency edges, which encode a grammatical relation between a source node (governor) and a destination node (dependent). While there are many dependency relationships, those we use in our analysis are:
• Direct Object: The dependent of this relation with respect to the root is the object that the main task is acted upon. • Compounds: These relations are part of the root verb or direct object of the task (e.g., łair conditionerž, łturn ofž). • Modiiers: These relations encode words that modify the meaning of a noun by specifying some additional quality, association, or attribute (e.g., łnew subscriberž -adjective modiier to subscriber). Usually, root deines the main task while Direct Object and Compound together deine the object, in addition to Modiiers that deine the properties of the object (Figure 9 ). However, sometimes the clausal complement to the root verb describes the main task instead. For example, in the trigger description łThis Trigger ires every time an audio event is detectedž, the root verb łirež is not the main task, but łdetectž is, which is a clausal complement to łirež. Moreover, łaudio eventž is a passive nominal subject to łdetectž instead of the Direct Object relationship. So, there are a few other dependency relations, e.g., Nominal and Passive Nominal subjects and Clausal Complements [21] , that we track to detect syntactic elements in order to accommodate the variability in unstructured text. These grammatical dependencies comprise the syntactic elements of interest for the remainder of our analysis.
After performing POS tagging, parsing and extracting the relevant syntactic elements, we also attempt to detect and exclude the Named Entities [9] from each text description. In preliminary experimentation, we found that this was necessary because named entities appearing in extracted object descriptions often seemed to encode similarity between dissimilar objects. For example, WeMo Humidiier and WeMo Lighting are likely to be unrelated in spite of a shared Named Entity WeMo. We therefore decide to exclude named entities to avoid bias when calculating object similarity. 6.1.2 Semantic Feature Extraction. After extracting the relevant text elements, we then encode the semantic relationship between the syntactic elements of the action and trigger as a vector of (continuous and binary) numerical features. These features are calculated by processing the syntactic elements of A and T in a pairwise fashion (i.e., verb-verb, object-object). Intuitively, if the elements of the trigger and action description have related semantics, it is likely that there exists a dependency between them. A summary of the feature vector is given in Table 2 .
Continuous Feature Computation:
We leverage the Word Vector Embedding technique to calculate Verb Similarity and Object Similarity features, which maps words from a vocabulary into vectors of real numbers. These vector representations are able to encode inegrained semantic regularities using vector arithmetic [64] . Based on vector arithmetic, we then use the word embedding tools (e.g., word2vec [16], GloVe [18] ) to calculate a real number score representing the semantic similarity between the two syntactic elements. We calculate pairwise semantic similarity scores for each pair of verbs and objects extracted from A and T . To calculate the similarity score for multi-word elements, we calculate a phrase vector as the average of the vectors of the component words [47] . Let phrase P be composed of words (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ) with vector embeddings (u w 1 , u w 2 , . . . , u w n ). The vector for P is then deined as: u P := 1 n n i=1 u w i . Finally, the semantic similarity score for the action and trigger phrases is calculated as the cosine similarity between the two vectors.
Binary Semantic Feature Computation: We are ultimately interested in speciic causal relationships between actions and triggers, but our continuous features relect any relationship between the syntactic elements. As a result of this broader focus, the similarity scores may underweight the relationship between two elements within the context of IoT; for example, word2vec(lock, door) with the Wikipedia-trained model we used yields a middling similarity score of 0.53, but in the IoT domain it is highly likely that a change in lock state suggests a change in door state. To correct for this, we also calculate a series of binary features for each action trigger pair, which we deine to capture generic semantic relationships that we found were commonly relevant to action-trigger lows during manual coding of our IFTTT dataset. For example, multi-word expressions (e.g., łturn onž) are commonly found in descriptions, but the verb particle on is often tagged as a preposition by the POS tagger, so we introduce a feature that tests if the verb particles match. These features are calculated using the lexical database Babelnet [69] , annotated and interlinked with semantic relations.
Classiication Problem
We cast information low detection as a supervised binary classiication problem between an action and trigger pair ⟨A,T ⟩, where both T and A belong to the same service S. Each ⟨A,T ⟩ pair is labeled such that 1 signiies the existence of a low from A to T while 0 signiies the contrary. We divide the dataset into training and test sets by service so that the classiier is unable to leverage servicespeciic semantics when classifying test samples. We use 4 diferent classiication algorithms -Support Vector Machine, Random Forest, Multilayer Perceptron and Logistic Regression. We use Grid Search with Cross Validation to search the hyperparameter space to optimize the classiier performance for a high recall (i.e., maximize proportion of actual positives identiied correctly) value. The decision of recall optimization comes from the intuition that it is safer to admit false lows than exclude true lows.
One issue with our dataset is that it is highly imbalanced because there are more spurious non-lows than true lows, i.e., the number of positive examples is far less than the number of negative examples. We use two diferent techniques to combat this problem. First, we use class-weights inversely proportional to the percentage of class examples in the training set. This assigns a higher misclassiication penalty to training instances of the minority class. Second, we use Random Oversampling to balance the data by randomly oversampling the minority class. We do not use undersampling of majority class since we have a limited sized dataset. 
Classiication Performance
Based on the methodology described above, we now evaluate the overall accuracy of our NLP-aided information low analysis tool. [69] to extract binary semantic features. The classiier's training and test sets were derived by randomly selecting 512 services from our IFTTT dataset, which is described in greater detail in Section 7.1. We divided this into 374 services for training and 138 services for testing. Because we were unable to purchase, conigure, and run all of the devices and services on IFTTT, our labeled ground truth is based not on applet invocations, but on manual coding by two of the authors; we consider the potential limitations of this approach in Section 8. Each coding decision entailed examining the text descriptions of the service to determine whether it was possible for a given action to lead to the invocation of a given trigger. The existence or absence of a low was usually obvious; occasionally the coders needed to look up the functionality of a service if they were not familiar with it. Manual coding entailed an author spending approximately 40 hours manually coding the intra-service lows, followed by a second author spending 5 hours on reliability coding [82] . for a total of 45 hours of human efort. There were a small number (less than 10 in total out of 512 services) of discrepancies identiied by the reliability coder, which were easily resolved between the two coders through a brief discussion. While this strategy for deriving intra-service lows is already tedious, we argue that it will shortly become entirely untenable as IoT platforms continue to grow in popularity. There is already evidence that this expansion of IFTTT is underway ś during a 5 month window in 2017, the platforms services, triggers and actions grew by 11%, 31%, and 27% respectively [63] .
Results.
We used the training set to train the classiier and the test set to compute the accuracy and AUC score. Then we fed the entire training set and test set together to our tool and computed recall, error rates and the amount of false low reduction. These results are summarized in Table 3 . We compare the performance of our NLP-aided tool using diferent classiication models against the baseline naïve strategy used in our preliminary experiments, which conservatively assumes a low exists between all actions and triggers of a service. Compared to this baseline which generates 6637 lows, our NLP-based tool with SVM classiier minimizes the FN rate to 9.2% while causing an overall reduction in graph complexity of 72%. This inding demonstrates that an NLP-based approach is a irst step towards overcoming the opacity of IoT platforms.
Discussion.
In light of the large number of false dependencies that exist using the naïve information low strategy, we feel that our error rates are promising. Here, a false positive signiies that our attack surface model is overly conservative, encoding a low between two rules that does not actually exist, while a false negative fails to identify a legitimate low.
We identify two error sources that can be directly attributed to our methodology. First, our approach depends on an accurate text description of the rule behavior; in cases where the trigger/action do not contain verbs that explain the behavior, we are unable to identify the low (True Error). In a few cases, the classiier's decision boundary detected ⟨A,T ⟩ pairs with high verb or object similarity as a non-low, or pairs with lower similarity scores as a low (Classiication Error). However, we did not want to overit our model to the dataset, so we restrained from ine-tuning the classiier to address this.
The larger sources of error in our system can be attributed to limitations in the underlying NLP tools we employed. (1) Text descriptions that generated complex syntax trees (with uncommon grammatical relations) led to false positives because we were unable to track the language elements indicating a non-low (Syntax Tree Complexity). (2) The POS-tagger sometimes labeled words incorrectly, leading to errors; for example, the łonž in łTurn onž might be detected as preposition instead of a verb-particle, third-person verbs sometimes detected as plural nouns, or the word everytime is detected as a verb (POS Tagger Error).
(3) Parsing errors by the CoreNLP parser module produced incorrect dependency trees, leading to incorrect feature vectors (Dependency Parsing Error). (4) Descriptions that contained complex object modiiers led to some false positives, e.g., łThis Action will create a regular post on your Blogger blogž and łThis Trigger ires every time you publish a new post on your Blogger blog with a speciic labelž (Complex Object Modiier). (5) Word embeddings often assign high similarity score to contextually similar verb pairs, for example łopen-closež, łactivate-deactivatež, thus confusing the classiier to record a false positive. (6) A signiicant source of error was that the word embedding models we used were not trained for the IoT domain, but a more general vocabulary (i.e., Wikipedia). This was especially problematic when novel words (e.g., łcool-modež) were encountered.
These error sources could potentially be addressed in future work through advancements in these techniques or by training NLP tools speciically for the IoT domain. Alternately, our method could be augmented with prediction uncertainty analysis and quantiication techniques [43] to request human intervention when the classiier is not conident enough in its prediction.
EVALUATION
Having generated an information low graph of IoT deployments using our NLP-aided analysis tool, we are now able to leverage iRuler to identify inter-rule vulnerabilities within real-world IoT platforms. In this section, we examine the potential for inter-rule vulnerabilities within the IFTTT ecosystem.
Dataset
We conduct our evaluation on a dataset crawled from the IFTTT website in October 2018 using the methodology introduced by Ur et al. in [86] . The data we collect is entirely public and includes only metadata about the published applets and services ś all user data in IFTTT is private, and thus not contained in our dataset, with the exception of aggregate applet install counts which are made public. 6 Our crawl identiies 315,393 applets and 674 services. The applets make use of 1,718 distinct triggers and 1,327 distinct actions. The applets were written by either service providers or 131,768 third-party authors (i.e., users). Some components of IFTTT applets are not publicly visible, making us unable to discover certain classes of inter-rule vulnerabilities; for example, because applet ilter code is not public, we cannot analyze IFTTT for the condition bypassing vulnerability. Instead, we limit our evaluation to action loop, conlict, revert, and action duplicate vulnerabilities.
The security of a given IoT deployment ultimately depends on its coniguration, i.e., the currently active set of rules. However, we are not aware of a publicly available dataset that describes how actual users conigure their IoT deployments; for example, on IFTTT each user's installed rules are private. This knowledge gap is not speciic to our study but belies a broader limitation in state-of-the-art IoT security research. Unfortunately, without an accurate picture of IoT conigurations, we are limited in our ability to identify real-world vulnerabilities in smart homes.
In order to evaluate iRuler, we make the observation that IFTTT actually exposes a limited amount of usage information that will allow us to approximate realistic IoT conigurations. We leverage this usage information in the form of 3 competing heuristics for synthesizing plausible trigger-action rule sets:
• Install Count Strategy. IFTTT reports the total number of installations of each applet. We normalize these install counts to assign each applet a weight and construct an IoT coniguration of r rules by performing a weighted random walk starting at a random point in the IFTTT information low graph. This strategy relects the intuition that popular applets are more likely to be simultaneously installed. • Service-Based Strategy. We construct an IoT coniguration by randomly selecting a small number of services, then randomly selecting r rules from within those services. This strategy relects the intuition that a user is likely to make use of only a small number of services. 6 We argue that this is analogous to security surveys of mobile app markets (e.g., [37] ) and therefore consistent with community norms governing ethical data collection. Figure 11 : The percentage of applet authors whose applets have at least one vulnerability.
• Author-Based Strategy. In IFTTT, authors have the option of sharing their applets publicly. We construct an IoT coniguration by assuming that an author has all of their public applets simultaneously installed. This strategy relects the intuition that authors are likely to use their own applets. We compare each of these heuristics to a baseline Random Strategy that uniformly selects at random r rules from the IFTTT dataset. Thus, our indings will not only serve to validate iRuler but also characterize the potential for real-world inter-rule vulnerabilities.
Results
We apply each IoT coniguration synthesis strategy for variable numbers of rules between 2 and 60, reporting the average number of discovered violations across 50 trials. Figure 10 shows the average number of vulnerabilities identiied as the number of active rules increases using the Random Strategy, Install Count Strategy, and Service-Based Strategy, respectively. In Figure 10 , action duplication is the most prevalent concern in the IFTTT ecosystem. Looping behaviors are also quite frequent, occurring at least once per coniguration when more than 15 rules are simultaneously active. While less prevalent, we also identify the potential for conlicts and reverting behaviors in many of the synthesized conigurations. The group action duplication vulnerability, while rare, was also observed in our tests. Using the Install Count Strategy, in total, 66% of the rulesets are associated with at least one inter-rule vulnerability.
We consider the Author-Based Strategy in a separate analysis because, unlike the other strategies, we are unable to control the number of trials and the number of active rules. Figure 11a shows the percentage of authors of applets with at least one vulnerability. Almost all authors' applets show evidence of at least one interrule vulnerability. Again, similar to prior test, duplication is the most common concern; Figure 11b shows the frequency of vulnerabilities excluding duplication. Concerningly, about 1 in 5 authors will experience a non-duplication vulnerability in their rule set if they activate at least 10 rules. However, some authors might not simultaneously activate all their applets, meaning that this test may overestimate the frequency of vulnerabilities. However, taken as a whole, this test provides compelling evidence that inter-rule vulnerabilities currently exist in the wild.
Our study also presents an opportunity to characterize the potential for rule chaining within TA platforms. Because rule chaining increases the complexity of an IoT coniguration, we theorize that it also increases the potential for security violations within the deployment. Across the 674 IFTTT services we analyzed, there exist 509 actions that can explicitly link to other rules and 518 triggers can be explicitly triggered by some action. In addition, we identify 460 actions that can afect an environment variable in order to indirectly invoke 392 triggers that monitor environmental variables. Table 4 summarizes our rule chaining results. We identify a total of 204,510 (64.8%) rules that can explicitly link to other rules, and 62,013 (19.5%) rules that can be explicitly linked by other rules. There exist 10,128 (3.2%) rules can implicitly link to other rules, and 6262 (2.0%) rules that can be implicitly linked by other rules.
Vulnerability Analysis
Condition Bypassing & Condition Blocking. While we introduce the notion of condition-based vulnerabilities in ğ4, we are unable to detect them on IFTTT because applets' ilter code is not public. We veriied the presence of condition vulnerabilities using our own applets but leave large-scale validation of this issue to future work.
Action Reverting. Our dataset contains 1127 applets with multiple actions, 50 of which contain contrary action pairs that revert each other. A rule susceptible to action-reverting by another rule/applet, usually occur within distance 1 or 2 of one another in the IFTTT information low graph, but the longest distance observed was 5 in a coniguration of 26 applets; such violations would likely to be diicult to identify manually. One example of such violation in our dataset consists of an applet that turns the lights on when motion is detected, but another applet turns of the lights whenever a light is turned on. A more concerning violation we observed was a rule that would disconnect a HomeSeer device from Wi-Fi the moment it was turned on, creating a DoS attack because the device cannot function or receive commands without a network connection.
Action Looping. Most of the loops we observed consist of 2 or 3 rules, while the longest loop contains 9 rules in a coniguration of 30 applets. We observed one rule chain that triggered IFTTT to call the user whenever their calendar received an appointment, while a second rule triggered IFTTT to make an appointment to the user's calendar whenever they missed a call. Hence, if a user sent IFTTT's autodial to voicemail, IFTTT would continue to call back while simultaneously illing her calendar with pointless appointments.
Action Conlicts. Most of the conlicting action pairs are direct actions of the same trigger (i.e., distance 1). There are also rules that conlict with other rules in another branch, including rule chain of length 4, longest in a coniguration of 23 rules. We observed a rule chain where two rules conlict: łArm the Scout Alarm when the user enters an areaž, and łTurn of the user's phone Wi-Fi when the user enters an areaž. The second rule disconnects the phone from the network, so IFTTT is unable to trigger the irst rule, i.e., arm Scout Alarm. We observe that the sequence of the iring triggers usually determines the inal states of the conlicting actions. We found one example where scoutalarm enters armed mode everyday from 10 AM until the user's phone connects to home Wi-Fi, but a second rule disables the home Wi-Fi every day at 9:55 AM. Combined, these will cause scoutalarm to irst disarm at 9:55 AM and then re-enter armed mode at 10 AM, even when the user is at home. Action Duplication. As seen from Section 7.2, action duplication is very common. It is perhaps not surprising to observe redundant rules in the community-based IFTTT ecosystem as developers may publish applets with the same function. A chain length of 8 in a coniguration of 38 rules is the longest we observed to contain an action duplicate violation. The number of group duplication violations we detected is very small as there are only 113 applets that use group actions. We further investigated that IoT services in IFTTT provides more group actions, such as Turn of device vs. Turn of all devices (Linn) or Disarm all cameras vs. Disarm a camera (Eagle Eye Nubo-Cam). We envision that as more functionalities are introduced in IoT devices, these superseding relationships will become more common, creating the potential for action-duplication vulnerabilities to signiicantly frustrate the debugging of IoT deployments.
DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS
Usability. The motivation of this work is to help users better diagnose potential security problems in their IoT deployments. In future work, we plan to evaluate the usability of iRuler through real world IoT user studies, and further characterize actual security threats. An important component of the future work is to extend iRuler to provide further assistance to non-expert users when an inter-rule vulnerability is found.
The IFTTT Applets Dataset. Similar to Ur's IFTTT recipe dataset in [86] , our dataset is missing relevant information that is not publicly available, including values for the trigger ields in each applet and the applet's ilter code (i.e., conditions). An interesting direction for further study is leveraging applet descriptions to attempt to recover these ields; for example, the applet łGet a phone call alert when a door is opened during sleeping hours, ž suggests the condition łduring sleeping hoursž is applied to the call_my_phone action. Note the model checker of iRuler already supports conditions. Synthetic IoT conigurations. Because we lack real-world examples of IoT deployment conigurations, in our evaluation, we use heuristic strategies to synthesize IoT deployments from our IFTTT dataset. Because ilter code is not publically visible, we conservatively assume in our analysis that any action that may low to a trigger will low to it. We also assume that environmental factors are always afected such that the low from action to trigger occurs. Thus, the vulnerabilities we detect may be absent from real-world conigurations. However, this method demonstrated the validity of iRuler for cases in which coniguration data is available. In our future work, we plan to conduct user studies to evaluate our tool with real-world IoT conigurations.
Manual Coding of Action-Trigger Flows. Due to the diiculty and cost of registering for hundreds of IFTTT services, many of which would require the purchase of one to dozens of devices in order to exercise, we had to rely on manual coding (not physical invocation) as our ground truth for information low on IFTTT. It is diicult to judge the correctness of our manual labeling without physical ground truth; however, because services are incentivized to write informative text descriptions of their functionalities, we believe that our coding was accurate enough to demonstrate the validity of our NLP approach. Regardless, this coding is a potential source of error in our analysis.
Applicability. We ensure the generality of our approach through presenting a realistic trigger-action rule model. While we have implemented iRuler for IFTTT, this model holds for other systems (e.g., Zapier and Microsoft Flow), as does the observation that NLP-based analysis is required due to the closed nature of these platforms.
RELATED WORK
IoT Security. Numerous vulnerabilities have been identiied in IoT devices [3, 45, 78] , protocols [2, 42] , apps and platforms [38] . Alrawi et al. [22] proposed a modeling methodology for IoT devices, associated apps and communication protocols to analyze devicespeciic security postures. Diferent from the network-based [79, 89] , platform-based [39] and app-based [49, 87] IoT-security solutions which detect vulnerabilities at runtime, iRuler leverages NLP and model checking to statically check vulnerabilities before an app is installed and executed. Celik et al. [29] use static analysis to identify sensitive data lows in IoT apps, while our work studies vulnerabilities caused by the interaction of multiple trigger-action rules. Several other studies consider challenges related to access control in IoT [44, 50, 74, 77] .
Trigger-Action Programming (TAP) in IoT. Researchers have studied how smart homes [33, 85, 88] and commercial buildings [66] can be customized using TAP, and the usability of existing TAP frameworks to propose guidelines for developing more user-friendly interfaces [46, 83] . Ur et al. [86] create a dataset of IFTTT recipes and analyze diferent aspects of the recipes. Bastys et al. [23, 24] discuss user privacy issues in IFTTT and developed a framework to detect private data leakage to attacker controlled URLs. However, they concentrate only on the privacy violations in the ilter code of individual applets, not the interaction between applets. Fernandes et al. [40] consider the efect of OAuth-related overprivilege issues on the IFTTT platform and proposed a way to decouple the untrusted cloud from trusted clients on the user's personal devices.
NLP-aided Flow Analysis. FlowCog [71] extracts app-semantics and contextual information that deines an android app behavior, and uses NLP to correlate the app behavior with the information lows in the app. Other work has used NLP to locate sensitive information in mobile apps and track information leakage to third-party libraries [35, 67] ; evaluate the semantic gap between mobile app descriptions and app permissions [72] , and match IoT app description with actual app behavior [84] . Ding et al. [36] use keyword identiication in the app description of SmartThings apps to detect app interaction-chains through physical channels. Surbatovich et al. [81] deine an information-low lattice to analyze potential secrecy or integrity violations in IFTTT recipes. While their work manually rewrites and labels triggers and actions to identify ruleinteractions chains, our approach uses NLP to automate this process. There are also eforts to build semantic parsers that creates executable code from IFTTT-style natural language recipes [53, 73] , which are orthogonal to our contributions.
IoT Automation Errors. IoT automation errors have been studied from various aspects, including analyzing logic inconsistencies and supporting end-user debugging to resolve them [20, 34, 51, 52, 90] as well as assisting IoT app developers with GDPR [58] . Chandrakana et al. [68] identify that too few triggers in automation rules is a source of errors and security issues. They propose a tool to determine a necessary and suicient set of triggers based on the actions written by end users. However, their tool analyzes each rule in isolation while we consider vulnerabilities from rule interactions. Some work has also been done on detecting and resolving automation conlicts in smart home and oice environments [59, 60, 65, 66, 80] ; in this work, we consider a broader class of vulnerabilities.
IoT Properties Checking. Several recent studies have proposed to check security or safety properties of IoT when multiple rules/apps are enabled. We compare our approach with other existing approaches in diferent aspects in Table 5 ; iRuler is among the works that support the more advanced features of TA platforms (Multiple Actions), incorporates a broad set of characteristics into its model (Environment Modeling, Device Location, Time Modeling, Support Checking Other Properties), and identiies new classes of inter-rule vulnerabilities. 7 Conversely, these works also provide several useful properties that we did not consider in iRuler. AutoTap [90] presents a method for verifying coniguration properties as expressed by novice users, and joins MenShen [28] , Salus [51] , and SIFT [52] in supporting automated creation and repair of rules (Rule Writing). Systems like Soteria [30] , IoTSan [70] , and Home-Guard (arXiv preprint only: [32] ) are based on source code analysis of IoT apps and can therefore consider additional factors such as iner-grained reduction of state explosion and speciic malicious input sequences. IoTGuard [31] instruments apps to check security and safety properties at runtime. Conversely, rather than leverage source code analysis, instrumentation, or a priori knowledge of app behaviors, our technique uses an NLP-based approach to infer information low. As a result, iRuler is necessarily less precise and ine-grained in its analysis but has the advantage of working out-of-the-box on commodity IoT platforms where source code is typically unavailable. 
CONCLUSION
While the trigger-action programming paradigm promotes the creation of rich and collaborative IoT applications, it also introduces potential security and safety threats if users do not take precautions in combining these apps. In this work, we generalize and examine inter-rule vulnerabilities in trigger-action IoT platforms, presenting a tool for their automatic detection. iRuler combines the power of SMT solving and model checking to model the IoT systems and check vulnerable properties. As a related contribution, we have also demonstrated an NLP-aided technique for inferring information low between rules in proprietary trigger-action platforms.
